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Abstract   
In this paper we focus on the market structure of the banking system in a set of 
Transition countries. In particular, by employing reduced-form revenue equations 
in a panel framework we are able to estimate the Panzar-Rosse h-statistic. We 
mainly control for heterogeneity by conditioning our estimation on bank-specific
characteristics so as to account for differences in financial risk, size and finance
mix. Our empirical results indicate that for the vast majority of cases banking 
systems operate under Monopolistic Competition.
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1. The terms market power and market structure will be used interchangeably in the paper. We 
recognise the fact that the two terms are not identical; in fact there is an ongoing debate in the 
Industrial Organisation literature on the issue, but in our context a distinction between the two is 
not crucial.
2. A term coined by Bresnahan (1989).
1. Introduction
The degree of competition in the banking sector has been at the frontier of research 
for the past two decades. Knowledge of the market structure1 is of particular impor-
tance to academics and policy makers as well as practitioners. Academics and policy 
makers seem to accept the view that financial intermediaries play a crucial role in
the effective functioning of modern economies, owing to their comparative advan-
tage in terms of information gathering, screening and monitoring - which result in 
economies of scale and scope (Diamond, 1984). For that reason, banks are sometimes 
characterized as being ‘special’ (for an extensive discussion see Bossone, 2000). In 
fact, recent research has arrived at an even stronger conclusion, namely that the ef-
ficacy of financial intermediation can also affect economic growth, if not exerting
a causal impact on it (King and Levine, 1993a, 1993b; Levine, 1997; Levine and 
Zervos, 1998). Given the strong links between market structure and the efficiency of
a particular sector, one would expect that the higher the degree of competition in the 
banking sector, the higher its efficiency in terms of allocating funds and in general
operating as an intermediary between lenders and borrowers.
 Following the breakthrough in the so-called new empirical industrial organization2 
literature significant progress has been made in the way econometric analysis can be
employed in order to measure market power utilizing firms’ observed behavior. In
particular, moving away from using standard measures such as concentration ratios, 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) have developed a systematic way to infer market structure 
in the form of the so-called h-statistic. By estimating reduced form revenue equations 
one can estimate unit input factor elasticities, which can then be used to construct the 
statistic. Panzar and Rosse show how one can map values of h to standard market 
structures.
 There are numerous studies which have applied this methodology to study the 
market structure of various banking systems, typically North American and Western 
European. For instance, recent studies have focused on the market structure of EU 
and US banking sectors (Molyneux et al., 1994, 1996; De Bandt and Davis, 1999). 
Along similar lines a number of studies have focused on the Canadian banking sector 
(Nathan and Neave, 1989; Perrakis, 1993; Shaffer, 1993).
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 However, there is a lack of studies focusing on the market structure of the bank-
ing sectors of transition economies. As mentioned earlier, the banking sector is of the 
utmost importance because of its special role in promoting growth and the smooth 
functioning of modern market economies. In the case of the central and eastern Eu-
ropean (CEE) and former Soviet Union (FSU) countries the banking sector is even 
more important since bank credit represents the main source of capital (Perotti, 1993). 
In this paper we focus on the competitive conditions in some transition banking sys-
tems. The choice of the specific transition banking systems that we examine has been
dictated by the availability of data at the bank level, which reflects the quality and
comparability of financial accounting and disclosure policies. For this reason we are
not able to cover the entire set of banking systems in transition; but in our view, given 
the data limitations, we do provide a comprehensive characterization of transition 
banking. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some 
background information regarding conditions in transition banking. Section 3 dis-
cusses the h-statistic and also has a methodological discussion. Section 4 presents 
the dataset used and the econometric methodology employed. Section 5 discusses the 
empirical results and finally Section 6 presents our conclusions.
2. Transition Banking: An Overview 
2.1 Facts and Trends
Following the historic political events that took place in the late 1980’s, CEE and 
FSU countries embarked on an extensive liberalization of their economies, which 
was the hallmark of their transition from the Soviet model of central planning to that 
of the market economy. The cornerstone for a successful transition was thought to be 
a strong and stable banking system in which bank credit would be allocated on a strict 
net present value basis (Saunders and Sommariva, 1993). During the pre-transition 
period, the dominant paradigm was that of a monobank, explicitly controlled by the 
state, whose main purpose was to accommodate the central plan by providing credit 
or monetizing debts. In fact, under central planning there was no need for a financial
system to allocate savings to investment since that was done by the plan (Gros and 
Suhrcke, 2000). As a result, banking practices in the former socialist countries were 
largely characterized by inefficiencies that took the form of large bad debts, prefer-
ential allocation of credit and distortionary pricing of loans (Brainard, 1991; Perotti, 
1993; Thorne, 1993; Roe et al., 2000).
 The establishment of a competitive banking system independent of the state, al-
beit effectively regulated by it, has been at the core of the strategies proposed by the 
IMF and the World Bank. As a consequence, demonopolisation, the breaking up of 
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the original monobank, resulted in a number of different state-owned banks,3 with a 
number of them privatized, which specialized in different products and operations 
(Long and Sagari, 1990). Additionally, a large number of private banks, including 
foreign banks, were granted operating licenses. In general, as Tang et al. (2000) point 
out, the number of banks (in absolute terms and also in terms of banks per popula-
tion) has dramatically increased. However, this hardly describes the experiences of 
all transition countries. The size of the banking sector, as measured by the number of 
banks, has indeed increased in comparison to its pre-transition size. However, within 
the transition period the size of the banking sectors has been shrinking, reflecting
probably the consolidation which took various forms (exit, mergers and acquisitions, 
and bank failures). Although the trend has been shared between CEE and FSU coun-
tries, the paths followed by each county were quite different.
 Today, almost fifteen years after the beginning of the transition process, the
economies of CEE and FSU countries have undergone major changes. Their banking 
sectors have changed dramatically both in terms of size, regulatory framework and 
practice. Moreover, a number of transition economies are in the process of joining 
the European Monetary Union. Therefore, it would be useful to assess the extent of 
the success of the transition process in terms of inducing competition in the bank-
ing sectors and evaluate the market structure of their banking sectors. It is a precept 
of socialist economic thought that the State should play a central and active role in 
determining this allocation. By contrast, under a market-oriented economy structure, 
this function is devolved to private savers and investors. Hence the transition to a 
market-based economy requires that the State retreat considerably in order to give the 
private sector scope to develop and decide how capital will be deployed.
 The withdrawal of the State implies reducing the powers of previously protected 
institutions or transforming them to operate within the context of a market. Thus it is 
interesting to see to what extent the policies that have been adopted in these countries 
have been effective in overcoming the persistence of state dominance in finance. In
all countries we are going to examine, one of the first steps in financial transition was
the implementation of two-tier banking, where the national bank spun off its com-
mercial banking activities into separate institutions. This created a commercial bank-
ing sector that was still essentially state-owned and controlled. Reducing the role of 
the State in making detailed decisions on credit allocation was to be accomplished 
by privatization of state-owned banks on the one hand and the emergence of new 
private banks on the other. Panel A of Table 1 shows the share of assets owned by 
State banks. According to this evidence, the State continues to dominate commercial 
3. An extreme version of this was the break up of the old Bulgarian monobank by making virtually 
every branch office an independent bank.
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banking in some of these countries. But the picture that emerges is that of a clear 
downward trend in all countries we consider, albeit at different speeds, reflecting dif-
ferent experiences in privatizing state-owned banks.
Table 1. State Dominance in Banking and Bank Credit Creation
Next, let us consider some aggregate measures of financial depth that would give
us an indication of the degree to which outside finance is available for investment
projects of all types through the banking system. Panel B of Table 1 reports data 
relevant to this question. Consider first the FSU countries. For Estonia, we see that
the fraction of domestic credit creation, which takes the form of loans to the private 
sector, has gradually increased over time. Conversely, there seems to be an upsurge 
in domestic credit creation in the early years of transition, and a gentle decline after-
wards. On the other hand, Lithuania and Ukraine exhibit a much more stable credit 
creation process, even though credit creation in Ukraine is extremely low. As far as 
the CEE countries are concerned, we see that Bulgaria starts out with a low rate of 
credit creation, which increases rapidly by the mid-1990s. The rest of the countries in 
our analysis seem to exhibit a stable domestic credit creation, with the Czech Repub-
lic leading the way (having an average credit creation rate of 58%), followed by the 
Slovak Republic (32%), Hungary (26%), Poland (13%) and Romania (11%).
 In Figure 1 we report the percentage of licensed banks with foreign ownership 
operating in the FSU and CEE countries relative to the total number of banks. The 
percentages reported exclude portfolio investments of foreign individuals but include 
wholly foreign-owned new banks, new banks with mixed ownership, and privatized 
banks where foreign companies have taken an identifiable stake. One may infer that
transition economies as a whole have been increasingly open to foreign banks.
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 Notes: Source: EBRD (1998). Panel A reports the asset share of state controlled banks in 
total banks assets. Panel B reports the bank credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP.
(a) Missing entries imply that the data was not available.
Figure 1. Percentage of Foreign Ownership Banks in Transition Economies
 Notes: Source: EBRD (1998) and authors’ calculations.
In the early 90’s it was widely believed that the arrival of foreign banks would create 
considerable competitive pressures in transition banking systems despite the fact that 
many banks remained state-owned (see also Panel A of Table 1). These pressures may 
have aggravated the problems of domestic banks in dealing with their portfolios of 
non-performing loans because good-quality borrowers switched to the foreign com-
petitors. However, although foreign competition has apparently squeezed margins to 
some extent, they have remained relatively high for the banking sector as a whole 
(Drakos, 2003).
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3. Assessing Market Structure: The Panzar- Rosse h-statistic
In order to assess the degree of competition in the banking sector in the economies 
under study, we employ the method developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987), which 
draws conclusions based on reduced form revenue functions. This method measures 
the degree of market power by the extent to which changes in cost (factor prices) are 
reflected in equilibrium revenues. Hence, the degree of competition in the markets
under study is assessed by the so-called h-statistic, which is computed as the elastic-
ity of gross revenue to cost. As Panzar and Rosse highlight in their seminal paper, 
estimating h as the factor price elasticity of revenues, provides a way of empirically 
assessing the impact of a shift in a firm’s cost curves on equilibrium revenue, even
though cost data might be unavailable.4
 On the one hand, when banks operate under perfect competition at their long-run 
equilibrium, then a proportional change in cost induces an equiproportional change in 
revenues; with a perfectly elastic demand, output does not change, while output price 
rises to the same extent that cost has changed. On the other hand, when banks operate 
in a monopolistically competitive environment, then revenues will increase less than 
proportionally to a change in cost, since the demand each bank faces is rather inela-
stic. Lastly, when banks operate as monopolists, there may be no response or even 
a negative response in revenues due to changes in cost. To this end, the statistic we 
seek to compute (h-statistic), will be non-positive in the case of monopoly ( ), 
positive but smaller than one in the case of monopolistic competition ( ), 
and will equal one under perfect competition ( ). The economic implications of 
the h-statistic are summarized in Table 2.
4. The description of the test here is given in accordance with the empirical analysis that follows. 
In fact, studies assessing competition in the banking industry such as Molyneux et al. (1994, 1996), 
de Bandt and Davis (1999), Nathan and Neave (1989), Perrakis (1993), Hempell (2002) inter alia, 
use the implications of the h-statistic with respect to factor price elasticities of the reduced form 
revenue function. In our study we employ an aggregate measure of cost and we do not further 
decompose cost to its components for two reasons. First, in many cases no data were available. 
Second, we know from duality theory that a 1% increase in all factor prices leads to a 1% upward 
shift in all of the firm’s cost curves. So instead of asking the question: what will be the percentage
change in equilibrium revenues resulting from a 1% change in all factor prices (i.e. the h-statis-
tic has been originally presented in Panzar and Rosse (1987) and subsequently used in empirical 
analyses), one could rephrase the question to read: what will happen to equilibrium revenues if 
costs increase by 1%.
190 K. DRAKOS, P. KONSTANTINOU
South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics 2 (2005) 183-209
Table 2. Interpreting the Panzar-Rosse h statistic
A critical feature of the h-statistic is that the Panzar-Rosse statistic is valid provided 
that the banking systems considered are in equilibrium. As suggested by various au-
thors (see in particular Molyneux et al., 1994), one should verify that costs are not 
correlated with industry returns, since competitive capital markets will equalize risk-
adjusted rates of return across banks. To implement such a test, one has to apply two 
“modified” versions of the Panzar-Rosse basic method, by estimating an equation as
the one described above (i.e. gross revenue on cost) with either the Return on Assets 
(ROA) or the return on equity (ROE) replacing bank revenue as the left hand side 
variable. In this framework, h=0 implies that the market is in equilibrium, while h<0 
would imply disequilibrium. It should be noted, that equilibrium does not imply that 
competitive conditions are not allowed to change, an assumption which would be 
violated for the period considered. It only implies that changes in the banking sector 
are taking place gradually.
 There are two things worth mentioning. First, as Panzar and Rosse (1987) point 
out, this approach may not hold for various oligopoly equilibria. For example, they 
show that in the case of a conjectural variation oligopoly the elasticity of the reduced 
form output function with respect to cost is negative, while the effect of cost on the 
reduced form revenues will, in general, be indeterminate. They also stress that their 
approach constitutes a joint test of the underlying theory and competitive behavior 
since some of the background assumptions include profit maximization and well-be-
haved revenue and cost functions. Regarding revenue and cost functions, continuity 
and differentiability are required; assumptions that are quite general and can accom-
modate a wide range of theoretical models.5
5. We are thankful to an anonymous referee for raising this issue on an earlier draft of the paper.
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 Secondly, the extension of the Panzar and Rosse (1987) methodology to banking 
requires the assumption that banks are treated as single product firms.6 Following De 
Bandt and Davis (1999), we assume that banks are considered mainly as financial
intermediaries. This is consistent with the so-called intermediation approach to bank-
ing, where the degree and nature of competition in the loans and deposits markets 
are independent.7 In our approach, firms are considered as producing credit and other
financial services. Hence, we use a total revenue measure, given that in the markets
that we are considering the struggle for survival makes the distinction between in-
terest and non-interest income rather irrelevant. We will return to this issue when 
presenting our data in the following section.
 The time paths of concentration ratios exhibit considerable similarity across coun-
tries although, as expected, in absolute terms there is variation that probably reflects
different initial conditions. Nevertheless, there is an underlying common downward 
trend in concentration that followed the initial wave of liberalization. Moreover, the 
speed of reduction in concentration also differs, probably highlighting the alternative 
policies (aggressive vs. gradualism) adopted, as well as the degree of liberalization 
in each country. Based on data for 2000, Hungary has the lowest (top-3 banks) con-
centration ratio (36.51 %) followed by Poland (39.86 %) and Latvia (44.33 %). At 
the other end of the spectrum one finds Romania (87.83 %), Bulgaria (76.04 %) and
Estonia (75.27 %). Concentration ratios across countries and years are reported in 
Table 3.
4. Data and Econometric Methodology
4.1 Data
The selection of the countries and banks for the analysis reflects the availability of
data at the bank level. The dataset consists of 218 banks from the following countries 
(number of banks in the sample): 8 Bulgaria (18), Czech Republic (22), Estonia (13), 
Hungary (29), Latvia (25), Lithuania (14), Poland (37), Romania (15), Slovak Re-
public (21), and Ukraine (24). The annual balance sheets and profit and loss accounts
of banks were collected from the database of Fitch-IBCA Ltd. BankScope (IBCA 
henceforth) for the period 1992-2000. Our dataset may suffer from selection bias due 
to the fact that IBCA reports data for large banks only. However, it is not clear in what 
direction this bias might affect our results. In any case, the banks included in our sam-
ple account for the vast majority of banking operations in their respective countries. 
6. Panzar and Rosse (1987) stress that their contribution has the drawback that it is valid only for 
single product firms, while they conjecture that the results should be similar in the multi-input,
multi-output case.
7. See Davis and Salo (1998), and De Bandt and Davis (1999) and the references therein for further 
details.
8. Sample descriptive statistics are reported in the appendix.
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Table 3. Concentration Ratios
 
 Notes: The table reports the m-firm concentration ratios of Total Assets for the banks in-
cluded in our sample. Panel A reports the concentration ratios based on the three largest banks, 
and Panel B the concentration ratios based on the five largest banks in our sample.
(a) The fact that the concentration ratio is 100% reflects the fact that some of the banks in our
sample do not report data for the specific year (the panel is unbalanced).
(b) Missing due to non-availability of data.
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Note, however, that market structure is reflected in behavior of market participants
rather than their actual number. In other words, provided that participants considered 
in the sample account for a sufficiently large part of the market then inference regard-
ing market structure would not be significantly impeded.                 
 The variables chosen are shown as they appear in the harmonized balance sheets 
of banks in the IBCA database. The likelihood of contamination of our result from 
different accounting practices is quite low given that IBCA ensures comparability of 
data. In particular, we collected data for: Total Assets (TA), Total Operating Income 
(REV), Total Operating Expenses (COST), Leverage (LEV), and Net Interest Mar-
gins (NIM).
 One innovation of this paper is that competitive conditions are inferred in terms 
of total income rather than interest revenue alone. This is considered to be highly 
relevant given that banks are seeking non-interest revenue as a supplement to declin-
ing interest income as deregulation and structural change proceeds. Although previ-
ous studies have used gross interest income as the dependent variable, in the current 
exercise we consider it is more appropriate to look at total income. The distinction of 
interest and non-interest income becomes less relevant since competition is equally 
vigorous for both. There may also be important complementarities, with both loans 
and other non-interest services provided in the context of a customer relationship. 
In other words, we view banks as firms producing a single homogeneous product.
Moreover, it would be hard to defend specialization of banks in their early phases of 
development. In Table 4, we report Net Interest Income (NII) and Total Operating 
Income (REV), as a percentage of total assets. Both NII and REV have steadily de-
clined since the mid-1990s, which should be attributed to increased competition and 
foreign entry.
4.2 Econometric Methodology
The vast majority of empirical studies, with the exception of De Bandt and Davis 
(1999), have explored the issue of market structure in a cross-sectional framework, 
where it is implicitly assumed that all banks have access to the same factor markets 
but only differ in terms of scale of operations. However, relying only on cross-sec-
tional variation (year-by-year estimation) may provide irregular results as De Bandt 
and Davis (1999) point out. Additionally, as Hannan and Liang (1993) highlight, 
cross-sectional cost comparisons cannot be adequately performed and important idi-
osyncrasies make comparisons highly suspect. For these reasons, we adopt a panel 
estimation approach, effectively utilizing information both from the cross-section of 
banks and their time series behavior.
 In order to assess the competitive conditions in CEE and FSU banking systems 
we will employ the Panzar- Rosse h-statistic. In particular, we start by analyzing each 
banking system on a country-by-country basis, effectively by pooling all available
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Table 4. Net Interest Income and Total Operating Income
Notes: Panel A reports the average of the Net Interest as a percentage of Total Assets, and 
Panel B reports the average of Total Operating Income (Revenue) as a percentage of Total 
Assets.
(a) Missing entries imply that the data was not available.
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data for banks in each country. We then pool all available observations (i.e. we em-
ploy all available data for all banks in each country) in order to assess the market 
structure for transition as a whole. Our generic model reads:
ln(REV
it
)=α+hln(COST
it
)+β
1
LEV
it
+β
2
ΝΙΜ
it
+β
3
ln(TA
it
)+u
it
where ln stands for the natural logarithm, {α,h,β
1
,β
2
,β
3
} are constant estimable pa-
rameters, u
it 
is a bank-specific well-behaved disturbance term, and the rest of the
variables are as defined above. We have estimated the parameters of the model under
three alternative specifications: a pooled regression i.e. imposing the same constant
and slope parameters across banks as in (1) above (NE, the model has no individual 
specific effects), allowing for fixed effects (FE) and finally, allowing for fixed effects
and time effects (FE & TD).9
 In the first case, equation (1) is estimated by OLS with a constant term on the
pooled sample of banks and years, implicitly assuming that all observations are in-
dependent. Then, as it is important to test whether omitted bank-specific variables
such as individual bank management and ability, etc., may affect inference, we exam-
ine the “fixed effects” estimator, by introducing different intercepts (we assume that 
u
it
=α
i
+η
it
, with η
it
~NIID        ). In this vein, we introduce some bank heterogeneity 
in our model, which is not captured by the explanatory variables. Next, in order to 
control for common across-banks or economy-wide disturbances (like world interest 
rates, inflation rates etc.) that influence the banking systems in our study, we intro-
duce common time effects (we assume that u
it
=α
i
+λ
t
+η
it
, with η
it
~NIID(         ), where 
λ
t
 varies over time but is common across individuals). 
 The parameter of interest is h, which in our context is an estimate of the Panzar-
Rosse statistic. In contrast to previous studies that have used interest revenue as the 
dependent variable, we follow De Bandt and Davis (1999) by choosing total operat-
ing income. The reason for doing so, is that in the light of recent market conditions 
the distinction between interest and non-interest income has become less relevant.
 As far as the specification of our empirical model is concerned, we explicitly al-
low for bank heterogeneity by including a set of bank-specific characteristics based
both on previous reported empirical regularities as well as standard finance theory.
For instance, we condition on financial leverage (LEV) in order to account for differ-
ences in financing mix. Similarly, we include net interest margins (NIM) since they
play a prominent role in the determination of bank revenue and also, to some extent, 
reflect market power and efficiency (Drakos, 2002). Finally, total assets (TA) are
included in order to account for differences in size.10
9. An appendix describing our econometric methodology in more detail is available upon request.
10. In previous versions of the paper we had also included loan loss reserves (LLR) in order to 
control for the risk profile as well. It turned out that this variable was insignificant in almost all em-
pirical specifications, and therefore it has been excluded. Needless to say, our results are invariant
to the inclusion/exclusion of this variable.
(1)
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 Before proceeding with the presentation of our empirical results, a word of cau-
tion is necessary. More specifically, it is well known that even in perfectly competitive
markets delayed changes in pricing of bank services and products imply a downward 
bias of the estimated h-statistic. In order to control for this event we should condi-
tion our estimation on the maturity structure of the bank assets.11 Unfortunately, such 
detailed data were not available to us and we were forced to proceed in our analysis 
without explicitly controlling for the maturity structure of the different banks in the 
banking systems in our analysis.
5. Empirical Assessment of the Market Structure
5.1 Empirical Results
Various alternative specifications of the base model were estimated, starting with a
pooled model without bank-specific effects, a model with fixed effects and finally
a model with fixed effects and common time effects. The results presented, our in-
ference and hypotheses testing for each country are based on the most adequately 
specified model, at which we arrive after a set of model reduction tests.12 The model 
selection statistics are reported in Table 5.
 The tests indicated that for the case of Ukraine a pooled regression model could 
not be rejected. In contrast, a model with Fixed-Effects is adopted for Hungary and 
Lithuania. Finally, a model with Fixed-Effects and Common Time Effects was the 
most adequate specification for the cases of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Latvia, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic and for the panel of banks as a 
whole.13 Having established which is the most adequate statistical model, we can now 
present our estimation results, which are reported in Table 6.
11. We are thankful to an anonymous referee of this journal for bringing this to our attention.
12. The interested reader is referred to Baltagi (2001) or Greene (1993) for more on the testing 
strategy.
13. We have also reported results for the whole panel of countries excluding the Czech Republic, 
and for the whole panel of countries excluding the Czech Republic, Latvia and Ukraine for reasons 
that we explain below. The adopted empirical specification in both cases is a Fixed-Effects with
Common Time Effects model.
K. DRAKOS, P. KONSTANTINOU
South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics 2 (2005) 183-209                                                                             197
Table 5. Model Selection (a)
FE & TD vs. FE F(-,-) FE vs. NE F(-,-) FE vs. RE(b) ~ ?????
Country Test Statistic(c)
FSU Countries
Estonia 3.849*** F(8,42) 4.285*** F(12,50) 10.948**
Latvia 3.197*** F(7,100) 2.687*** F(24,107) 24.645***
Lithuania 0.533 F(7,55) 3.280*** F(13,62) 1.327
Ukraine 0.466 F(7,64) 1.325 F(23,71) 7.019
CEE Countries
Bulgaria 4.231*** F(7,65) 1.236 F(17,72) 2.381
Czech Rep. 1.879* F(8,110) 9.593*** F(21,118) 20.774***
Hungary 1.122 F(8,159) 4.400*** F(28,167) 3.880
Poland 2.187** F(8,180) 5.906*** F(36,188) 8.869*
Romania 4.116*** F(8,48) 1.714* F(14,56) 13.024**
Slovak Rep. 2.064** F(8,79) 2.998*** F(20,87) 9.223*
Transition Banking
All Countries 6.070*** F(8,791) 4.626*** F(217,799) 21.444***
All Countries 
(B)
4.087*** F(8,884) 3.661*** F(195,892) 19.687***
All Countries 
(C)
2.225** F(8,697) 5.032*** F(147,705) 7.540
 
Notes:
(a) The acronyms used imply: NE: Pooled Regression (No Effects), FE: Fixed Effects, 
FE & TD: Fixed Effects allowing for common time effects by means of Time 
Dummies, and finally RE: Random effects. The second entry All Countries (B)
includes all countries in the sample excluding the Czech Republic, while the third 
entry All Countries (C) excludes the Czech Republic, Latvia and Ukraine from the 
sample.
(b) Hausman’s (1978) Test.
(c) One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level
respectively.
More specifically, we first estimate the more general model that features FE & TD and we
examine whether it can be reduced to a FE model (i.e. whether we can eliminate common 
time effects); this reduction is tested via an F-test (likelihood ratio test). If this restriction 
is not rejected we proceed with testing whether the obtained FE can be further reduced to 
a pooled regression (i.e. whether fixed-effects can be disregarded) again by means of an
F-test (likelihood ratio test). Finally, we test a Random Effects (RE) specification vs. a FE
specification, using Hausman’s (1978) test.
c2 (4)
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Table 6. Estimation Results (Estimation Period 1992-2000)
Notes: NE: Pooled Regression, FE: Fixed Effects, and FE & TD: Fixed Effects with 
Time Effects. Values of t–statistics are given in square brackets. For the Czech Republic and 
the Slovak Republic the sample runs from 1993 to 2000. The second entry All Countries (B) 
includes all countries in the sample, excluding the Czech Republic, while the third entry All 
Countries (C) excludes the Czech Republic, Latvia and Ukraine from the sample.
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On a general level, the estimates for the h-statistic are significant with point estimates
between zero and unity. In the majority of cases the selected conditioning variables 
are significant and the estimated models exhibit high explanatory power,14 but the re-
siduals do not seem in general well behaved. Closer inspection of the residuals reveals 
that the deviations from the assumption of normality arise due to heteroscedasticity.15 
We explicitly take this issue into account below in our sensitivity analysis. 
 Another point that deserves attention is that when we examined the results for 
all the countries together by pooling all banks in our panel, we noticed that the coef-
ficients of Leverage and Net Interest Margins seemed to be heavily influenced by the
inclusion of the Czech banks in the panel. More specifically we noticed that when the
Czech Republic was included in the panel, the coefficients for the whole panel were
of the same order of magnitude as those for the Czech Republic. We have therefore 
decided to report results for a panel that excludes the Czech banks in order to have a 
more comprehensive view of transition banking (labeled All Countries (B)).
 For all cases the coefficients of Total Assets are highly significant and invariably
positive. This finding suggests that size does matter and, ceteris paribus, larger banks 
seem to enjoy higher operating income. With the exception of the Czech Republic 
banks (and the whole group when Czech banks are included in the panel), the same 
holds for the coefficients of Net Interest Margin. This finding is in accordance with
our priors, since ‘larger’ margins tend to be associated with increased interest revenue 
and therefore higher operating income. The sign on the coefficient of Leverage is not
uniform across cases, and is significant in six out of ten cases. For the banking sys-
tems in which the effect of Leverage is significant, our findings imply that with the
exception of the Lithuanian banks, more ‘leveraged’ firms tend to be associated with
higher revenue.
14. The adjusted R2 is typically above 0.90 with a minimum of 0.80.
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 In order to examine the validity of our analysis, we next examined whether the 
banking systems under study are in equilibrium. As already mentioned formal tests 
employ a variant of equation (1), where the Revenue (REV) is replaced by a measure 
of (equilibrium) return such as the Return on Equity (ROE) or the Return on Assets 
(ROA). However, for the case of any transition economy it is difficult to advocate
that markets operate at their long run (equilibrium) level since that would be a contra-
diction in terms (after all, they are still in the transition phase). So the way to interpret 
these ‘equilibrium’ tests is that equilibrium does not mean that competitive condi-
tions are not allowed to change. It only implies that changes in banking are taken as 
gradual16. Our ‘equilibrium’ tests are summarized in Table 7.
 Table 7 reports two alternative ways of examining ‘equilibrium’: one using the 
ROA and another using the ROE, instead of revenue as the right-hand side variable.17 
The first finding that emerges from the results in Table 7, for almost all CEE coun-
tries, is that there is no evidence against the hypothesis that the “modified” h statistic 
is equal to zero, regardless of whether we employ ROA or ROE. The data support 
the notion that markets are in equilibrium (again recall our discussion above of what 
‘equilibrium’ means). The same holds when we pool all banks across different coun-
tries in our sample. This provides support for our conclusions below regarding the 
degree of competition in the markets under study. As far as the FSU countries are 
concerned, the Estonian banking system also seems to be in ‘equilibrium’. On the 
other hand, Lithuania seems to be on the borderline when ROA is used, whereas the 
hypothesis of ‘equilibrium’ is not rejected when we use ROE. Similarly, the results for 
Ukraine also show that the assumption of ‘equilibrium’ might be marginally violated. 
Lastly, in the case of Latvia, the assumption of ‘equilibrium’ seems strongly violated.
 In order to avoid contamination of our results from banking systems that do not 
seem to operate in ‘equilibrium’, when we pool all the banks in our sample, we are 
also going to focus on a sample excluding banks from the Czech Republic for reasons 
outlined above, as well as banks from Latvia and Ukraine (which we have labeled 
All Countries (C)). Furthermore, for the sake of completeness and for reasons of 
comparability, in presenting our tests below, we will also report results for the bank-
ing systems that do not seem to operate in ‘equilibrium’. Given that these banking 
systems might not be in equilibrium, the results should be interpreted with caution 
and it is left to the reader to assess their importance.
 Now, focusing on each country and based on the selected models we are able to 
draw inferences with regard to their recovered market structure. The Wald tests18 on 
h are summarized in Table 8.
16. See also DeBandt and Davis (1999) for a similar reasoning.
17. It should be noted that ROE and ROA are linked together by the Du Pont Identity: ROE = ROA 
× (Assets/Total Equity).
18. These are basically t-tests, but they are based on the Wald testing principle since in order to 
test a restriction on a parameter of the model (here h) we use only the unrestricted estimates of the 
model. See Greene (1993) Ch.4 for a short discussion.
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Table 7. Estimation Results - Equilibrium Tests (Estimation Period 1992-2000)
Notes: NE: Pooled Regression, FE: Fixed Effects, and FE & TD: Fixed Effects with 
Time Effects. Values of t-statistics are given in square brackets. For the Czech Republic and 
the Slovak Republic the sample runs from 1993 to 2000. The second entry All Countries (B) 
includes all countries in the sample, excluding the Czech Republic, while the third entry All 
Countries (C) excludes the Czech Republic, Latvia and Ukraine from the sample.
202 K. DRAKOS, P. KONSTANTINOU
South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics 2 (2005) 183-209
Table 8. Wald Tests for the h-statistic
Notes: The Wald tests reported are either two-sided (for H
0
: h = 1) or one-sided (for H
0
: 
h£1 and H
0
: h£0) t-tests and are distributed as t (N
i
+T
i
-k) where k is the number of parameters 
estimated under the null (including the coefficients on time dummies where appropriate).
The second entry All Countries (B) includes all countries in the sample excluding the Czech 
Republic, while the third entry All Countries (C) excludes the Czech Republic, Latvia and 
Ukraine from the sample.
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    The null hypothesis that the h-statistic is zero is not rejected for Latvia – which 
was found to be in disequilibrium above – while for the other nine countries we 
emphatically reject the null, as well as for the pooled panel.19 Our main hypotheses, 
namely whether h is equal to unity, between zero and one or less than zero, allow us 
to distinguish between alternative market structures. Our hypothesis testing provides 
overwhelming evidence against the null of perfectly competitive banking sectors 
in either group of CEE or FSU countries. Similarly, when pooling all available 
information in the panel, we note that transition banking (even when we exclude 
some banking systems due to problems outlined above) as a whole, is consistent 
with a monopolistically competitive market structure. In fact, our results suggest that 
most of the banking sectors we have studied are consistent with the paradigm of 
monopolistic competition.
5.2 Sensitivity Analyses
To assess the robustness of our results, we undertook various sensitivity analyses. 
The results from our sensitivity analyses are summarized in Table 9. First, our panel 
exhibits non-normality due to heteroscedasticity. In order to control for the presence 
of heteroscedasticity, we have used heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (White, 
1980). The only change (see fourth column of Table 9) was encountered in the case 
of Poland, where the h-statistic became statistically insignificant.
Second, we estimated equation (1) in first differences in order to check to what extent
our results are influenced by the presence of deterministic terms (e.g. constant, fixed-
effects and time effects). Given the original model we have estimated
ln(REV
it
)=α+hln(COST
it
)+           β
k
x
k,it
+u
it
with u
it
=μ
i
+λ
t
+v
it
, v
it
~IID              , by first differencing we obtain:
Δln(REV
it
)=hΔln(COST
it
)+           β
k
Δx
k,it
+(λ
t
-λ
t-1
)+η
it 
,
where η
it
=v
it
 - v
it-1
, thus eliminating the constant and the fixed effects. In this manner
we can focus on the coefficient of interest, namely h. The first thing we note is that
there is a small reduction in the absolute magnitude of the h-statistic in the major-
ity of cases (see fifth column of Table 9). It turns out that the differences are quite
small – exceptions include Latvia (for which the h-statistic becomes positive) and 
the Czech Republic (for which the h-statistic is reduced sharply) – but in general, the 
inferred market structure remains unaltered. 
(1΄)
19. The two marginal cases are Estonia with p-value [0.06] and Poland with p-value [0.07].
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Table 9. Sensitivity Analyses (Estimation Period: 1992-2000)
Notes: The sample for the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic runs from 1993 
to 2000. (a) We employ heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors using White’s (1980) 
method. (b) We estimate the model in first differences to check that the results are similar
to the NE, FE and, FE & TD estimator. (c) We have estimated the specific model chosen for
each country, after eliminating from the sample banks that report data for a period of less than 
three consecutive years. (d) The number of foreign banks is included as a regressor in the 
empirical specification. Although there is no theoretical reason for such a choice, we hope that
in this way we can capture the alleged effect that foreign banks would have on the degree of 
competition in each country and hence on h.
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 Third, in order to examine if our results were biased by the inclusion of banks that 
either did not report data for the whole period or went out of business, we eliminated 
those banks who report data for less than three consecutive years. Our results (sixth 
column of Table 9) indicate that there is no qualitative change of the estimated h-sta-
tistics. 
 Finally, we have also included the number of foreign banks as a regressor in the 
empirical specification in order to capture the degree of banking sector openness
(last column of Table 9). In this case, inference regarding the h-statistics was almost 
invariably unaltered.
 We believe that our results can shed light on the observed market experiences 
and by doing so they can be used to assess regulation and policies in a dynamic and 
comparative way. However, they cannot be used to ‘predict’ what the results of these 
policies will be in the future. Moreover, the usefulness of our results is that they 
provide a benchmark to which policy makers could compare future performance and 
market structure. Of course we should not forget that similar market structures have 
been found for other major European economies (e.g. Germany, France and Italy; De 
Band and Davis, 1999).
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have followed recent research in evaluating competitive conditions 
in banking markets and focused on a sample of banks from a group of CEE and FSU 
countries. More specifically, we have utilized reduced form revenue equations to
estimate the Panzar-Rosse h-statistic. This statistic was then utilized to assess com-
petitive conditions in the banking markets in the corresponding countries. In our em-
pirical specification we have controlled for bank heterogeneity by conditioning our
estimation on bank-specific characteristics that take into account each bank’s general
financial profile. However, our short sample period as well as the substantial year-to-
year variations of the results prevents us from drawing conclusions regarding trends 
in banking competition. Our findings are therefore limited to the assessment of the
level of competition in the banking market for the period 1992-2002.
 Our findings suggest that almost all banking sectors in our sample are consistent
with the paradigm of monopolistic competition. In some cases, like those of Latvia 
and Ukraine, we found that the banking systems are far from anything that could be 
characterized as an ‘equilibrium’, hence for these two cases our results are hard to 
interpret: essentially the underlying theory would have to be rejected.
 The policy implications emerging from our analysis can be summarized as fol-
lows. For the particular period and banking sectors analyzed, our results imply that 
transition banking is adequately described by a monopolistically competitive market 
structure. It seems that the transition process has definitely succeeded in introducing
a higher level of competition in the banking sector, as this is measured by the Panzar-
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Rosse h-statistics. We should point out however, that if the goal was to converge to 
a perfectly competitive market, this has not been realized, at least within the period 
we analyzed. It would be interesting to assess these policies depending on their time 
horizon, but policy makers should bear in mind that at best what they should hope for, 
is a degree of competition similar to that in other countries, e.g. Western European 
countries. Our analysis shows that transition countries, which have prudentially in-
creased the size of their banking sectors and also allowed foreign banks to enter their 
banking system, are well described by the monopolistic competition, a paradigm 
which also describes well the behavior of banks of more developed economies.
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